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ABSTRACT
Deflation has had a bad rap, largely based on the experience of the 1930's when deflation was
synonymous with depression. Recent experience with declining prices in Japan and China together
with the concern over deflation in Europe and the United States has led to renewed attention to the
topic of deflation. In this paper we focus our attention on the deflation experience of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany in the late nineteenth century during a period
characterized by low deflation, rapid productivity growth, positive output growth, and where many
nations had a credible nominal anchor based on gold: circumstances which have resonance with the
world of today. We identify aggregate supply, aggregate demand, and money supply shocks using
a structural panel vector autoregression. We then use historical decompositions to investigate the
impact that these structural shocks had on output and prices. Our findings are that the deflation of
the late nineteenth century reflected both positive aggregate supply shocks and negative money
supply shocks. However, the negative money supply shocks had little effect on output. This we posit
is because the aggregate supply curve was very steep in the short run during this period. This
contrasts greatly with the deflation experience during the Great Depression. Thus our empirical
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I. Introduction 
Recent concerns by the FOMC at its meeting in May 2003 that the "balance of 
risks in the US had shifted in favor of deflation", similar concerns raised by an IMF 
Report on Deflation (2003) over the risk of deflation in Europe, especially Germany and 
Switzerland, and the experience of declining price levels in China and Japan has sparked 
new interest in the subject of deflation. In this paper we examine the issue from an 
historical perspective. We focus on the experience of deflation in the late nineteenth 
century when most of the countries of the world adhered to the classical gold standard. 
The period 1880-1914 was characterized by two decades of secular deflation followed by 
two decades of secular inflation.  
The price level experience of the pre-1914 period has considerable resonance for 
recent concerns over the possibility of deflation’s re-emergence. Four elements of the 
earlier experience are relevant for today’s environment: deflation was relatively low (1-
3% in most countries); productivity advance was rapid; the real economy was growing; 
and the price level was anchored by a credible nominal anchor – adherence to gold 
convertibility.  
Deflation has had a ‘bad rap’. Possibly as a consequence of the combination of 
deflation and depression in the 1930s, deflation is associated with (for some, connotes) 
depression. In contrast, a basic tenet of monetary theory – the Friedman rule – suggests 
that deflation (albeit perfectly anticipated) is an outcome of optimal monetary policy. On 
the face of it, the evidence from the late 19th century was mixed: on the one hand, the 
mild deflation in the period 1870 - 1896 was accompanied by positive growth in many 
countries, however, growth accelerated during the period of inflation after 1896.  
We distinguish between good and bad deflations. In the former case, falling prices 
may be caused by aggregate supply (possibly driven by technology advances) increasing 
more rapidly than aggregate demand. In the latter case, declines in aggregate demand 
outpace any expansion in aggregate supply. For example, negative money shocks that are   2 
non-neutral over a significant period would generate a ‘bad’ deflation. This was the 
experience in the Great Depression (1929-33), the recession of 1919-21, and may be the 
case in Japan today.
1 There is also a third possibility – the Classical case where deflation 
– for example caused by negative money shocks - is neutral, as when monetary neutrality 
holds.
2  
We focus on the price level and growth experience of the United States, the U.K. 
and Germany from 1880-1913. All three countries adhered to the international gold 
standard, under which the world price level was determined by the demand and supply of 
monetary gold, and each member followed the rule of maintaining convertibility of its 
national currency into a fixed weight of gold. This meant that the domestic price level 
was largely determined by international (exogenous) forces.  
 We proceed by identifying separate ‘supply’ shocks, money supply shocks and 
‘non-monetary’ demand shocks using a Blanchard-Quah methodology. We identify the 
shocks by imposing long run restrictions on the impact of the shocks on output and 
prices, and then do a historical decomposition to examine the impact of each shock on 
output and the price level.
3 We present three sets of empirical results: firstly, results for 
each country from estimating a panel over the period 1880-1913, then results from 
estimating a panel over only the deflationary period, 1880-96, and finally results from the 
entire period in a model in which gold supply shocks are included as an exogenous 
variable. Contrasting the first two series of results enables us to discuss the symmetry 
between the deflationary and inflationary period, while in the third set we separate money 
supply shocks coming from gold shocks from those coming from intermediation shocks. 
                                                 
1 The traditional explanation for this non-neutrality is nominal rigidities and more recently balance sheet 
effects are also ascribed an important role (Bernanke, 1983). 
2 Many people take issue with the term “good” deflation on the view that any departures from price 
stability are problematic. An alternative set of terms that we could use are “benign” versus “malignant” 
deflation or “the good, the bad and the ugly” as used by Borio and Filardo (2003). These terms connote: 
productivity driven deflation as used by us; low deflation and stagnation as has been the case in Japan; and 
the interwar experience. 
3 A similar methodology is followed in Bordo and Redish (2004). The results of the historical 
decompositions for the money stock, as well as the results from forecast error variance decompositions, are 
not presented in this paper for space reasons, but are available from the authors on request.  The results are 
consistent with those reported in this text.   3 
The paper begins by briefly describing the data and historical environment. We 
then discuss the empirical methodology to be used. Our empirical analysis is presented in 
the next three sections, and the final section discusses the results and their implications 
and limitations. 
Focussing on our interest in the deflationary episode, our results in a nutshell 
suggest that the deflation was generated by monetary factors, but that these monetary 
factors do not explain much of the behaviour of output. Output was determined by non-
monetary factors and the deflation was essentially good or neutral.  
II. The context 
Figure 1 illustrates the behaviour of the money stock, prices (GDP deflators) and 
real incomes in the three countries over the period 1880 - 1913. We use broad money 
(M2) as our measure of money stock, real GDP as our measure of real income and the 
GDP deflator as our measure of prices.
4 While there are differences in the patterns there 
are a few common trends: price levels declined – more in the U.S. than elsewhere - over 
the period 1880 to the mid 1890s, and subsequently rose. The money stock rose secularly, 
the most pronounced rise occurring in Germany, and in the U.S. the growth rate increased 
after 1896. Income levels rose with a slight acceleration in the US and UK after the 
1890s, but German output growth decelerated (very slightly) from its very rapid post-
1870s rate after the mid-1890s.   
The period 1880-1913, encompassed myriad economic events. Technological 
changes occurred rapidly, and earlier changes were implemented at the production level. 
German and US growth outpaced that of England. Early historians had described the 
period before 1896 as a ‘great depression’ but more recent historiography has recast the 
period as one of deflation without depression (Craig and Fisher, 2000). Although there 
were very severe recessions, particularly in the early 1890s, secularly incomes rose. 
                                                 
4 Data are available from the authors on request. Sources: US – Balke and Gordon (1986); UK – Mitchell 
(1998); Germany – Prices: Sommariva and Tullio (1987); GDP:  Mitchell (1998); Money: Deutsche 
Bundesbank (1976). Real output is denominated in 1913 pounds sterling while nominal money supply is 
denominated in current pounds sterling. The GDP deflators are used as the price series and these are based 
in 1913.    4 
Particularly noteworthy is the transmission of business cycles across economies, with all 
three of our economies experiencing common cycles.
5   
At the monetary level there were also secular trends and cyclical fluctuations. The 
gold standard tied the quantity of money to the stock of gold. Figure 2 shows that world 
gold production was constant and relatively low from 1870 to 1890 while after the early 
1890s it grew. The growth reflected gold discoveries in South Africa as well as Australia 
and North America.   
III. Methodology 
Our empirical analysis is grounded by a model of money supply under the gold 
standard. The appropriate modeling strategy depends on the time horizon of interest, 
whether one is interested in the very long run, the long run or business cycle frequency. 
The ‘very long run’ we consider to be a period long enough for the quantity of gold 
mined to respond endogenously to macroeconomic variables.
6 Given the short span of 
data available for our empirical analysis, we do not attempt to capture effects over this 
period, and restrict ourselves to long run and business cycle frequencies. 
The long run is defined here as a period over which purchasing power parity 
holds, and we model a world comprising several gold standard economies linked together 
by trade in gold, goods and capital. We assume that in each economy the quantity of 
money is a stable function of the country’s stock of monetary gold, but the function is 
allowed to vary across countries reflecting, for example, the existence or not of a central 
bank, required reserve ratios, the degree of monetization and the nature of the banking 
system. The world price level is determined by the world demand for money (based on 
the determinants of velocity and aggregate income) and the supply of money (the supply 
being determined by stocks of gold and the nature of intermediation). Individual 
economies take the world price level as exogenous. For each country we identify three 
                                                 
5 See IMF (2002) and Bergman, Bordo and Jonung (1998). 
6 For example, models in Bordo and Ellson (1985) and Dowd and Chappell (1997) allow the quantity of 
gold mined to respond endogenously to the price level, through investment in refining technologies and 
exploration. See also, Barro (1979) and Rockoff (1984). Rockoff argues that the increased gold production 
of the late 19
th century was a response to the incentive of the high real price of gold (i.e. low price level).   5 
shocks that drive the joint behaviour of prices, output and the money stock: a money 
supply shock, a technology shock, and a non-monetary demand shock, where the 
definition of each shock is implicit in the identifying assumptions described below.    
We model output, prices and money supply using the following tri-variate VAR 
in differences:  
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where  () t t t t M GDP price y , , =  and Dt is a matrix of deterministic variables that includes 
a constant and possibly a time trend. The data are tested for the presence of a unit root 
and are differenced to make them stationary.  
Underlying the reduced form specification, (1), is a set of structural innovations, 
ut, that are orthogonal to each other and are related to the reduced form innovations in (1) 
by 
(2)   t t Cu = ε . 
Our aim is to identify orthogonal shocks, ut, that can be interpreted as an 
aggregate supply shock, a nominal money supply shock and a non-monetary aggregate 
demand shock. To this end, we identify C by imposing long-run restrictions on the 
structural impulse response functions implied by (1). These long-run restrictions are 
imposed using the method described in Blanchard and Quah (1989).   
In order to exactly identify C for each country, we need to impose at least three 
independent long-run restrictions on the impulse response functions from (1). Our 
preferred identification is as follows: An aggregate demand shock is assumed to have 
zero long-run impact on output and prices. That is, the demand shock has no permanent 
impact on prices or output. We also assume that the aggregate supply shock, in the 
context of the gold standard, has no permanent impact on prices. That is, the long-run 
impact of an aggregate supply shock on price is zero.    6 
This identifying restriction follows from the fact that the countries in our sample 
were all strictly adhering to the gold standard during the sample period. An aggregate 
supply shock would be expected to initially lower the price level and increase real output. 
The decline in the price level would lead in turn to a gold inflow via the current account, 
hence raising the money supply and price level. Thus, gold flows will have the effect of 
causing price levels, in the absence of further shocks, to return to their original levels.  
These three long-run restrictions are enough to exactly identify C and hence 
identify the structural shocks, ut. We thus impose no restrictions on the impact of the 
third shock. This is the only long run influence on the price level and can be interpreted 
as a world price level shock or, in the context of our model, as a money supply shock. 
The aggregate demand shocks are presumably an aggregate of money demand shocks and 
temporary spending shocks, which cannot be disentangled. The effect of such an 
aggregate on prices and output in the short run would depend on its component mix, and 
we essentially treat this as a reduced form construct.  
A summary of our preferred identifying restrictions is: 
1.  An aggregate supply shock has no long-run impact on prices. 
2.  An aggregate demand shock (combining the impact of velocity and spending 
shocks) has no long-run impact on either prices or output. 
3.  The long run (and short run) impact of a nominal money supply shock on money, 
output and prices is unrestricted. 
The long-run impact of shocks to ut, the structural innovation vector, is 
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1 )) 1 ( (
− − = , 
where  p
pL A L A I L A − − − = K 1 ) (  and  ∑ − = =
p
j j A I A 1 ) 1 ( . Assuming that the structural 
innovation vector is ordered as  ) shock demand , shock supply  , shock money ( ′ = t t t t u  then 






















In addition to our preferred identification there are other possible long-run 
restrictions that could have been imposed. The most likely additional restriction is money 
neutrality, which would imply that the long-run impact of a money shock on output is 
zero.  The addition of this long-run restriction leads to the long-run impact matrix 





















Clearly this leads to an over-identified system. Following the method described in 
Amisano and Giannini (1997), the over-identifying restrictions imposed in (5) can be 
tested. If this extra long-run identification cannot be rejected it will be imposed. 
However, we prefer not to impose money neutrality but rather allow the data to tell us if 
money neutrality holds during this sample. Only then do we impose this additional long-
run restriction.  
Another possible combination of the four long-run restrictions given in (4) and (5) 






















In this specification money neutrality would be imposed while the impact of the supply 
shock would be unconstrained. The set of constraints given in (6) exactly identify the 
structural shocks. If (5) is rejected we are left with a decision on whether to use (4) or (6), 
and opt for (4) on the basis of the historical context.  
Given the small sample size inherent in the data there are efficiency gains from 
pooling the data and estimating a panel VAR (PVAR) given by   8 
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The maintained assumption in this exercise is that the slope coefficient matrices, 
Bij, are common across the countries in the panel. Different growth rates between 
countries and periods are allowed by permitting the constant terms in each VAR to be 
different. Also, the variance-covariance matrix of the innovations for each country 
specific VAR, i ∑ , is allowed to differ across countries. This assumption allows for cross-
sectional heteroscedasticity in the data. One implication of permitting cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity is that individual countries are not constrained to have the same 
responses to structural shocks. All that is being assumed is that all countries have the 
same slope coefficient matrices in the reduced form VAR. Also, the values of the slope 
coefficients do not change throughout the sample. These two assumptions are tested and 
the results of these tests are reported in Table 1 and Table 2.  
The PVAR in (7) is estimated using the standard seemingly unrelated regression 
estimator (SURE) with cross-equation restrictions imposed as defined above. This allows 
us to exploit the panel structure and any contemporaneous correlation in shocks between 
countries to improve the efficiency of our estimates. After estimating our PVAR we then 
estimate Ci for each country using the scoring algorithm defined in Amisano and 
Giannini (1997) and use these estimates to calculate structural impulse response functions 
for each country. Once we have Ci we are also able to construct the structural shocks 
implied by (2).  
The structural impulse response functions isolate the impact of each of our 
identified shocks on each variable. Since we impose no restrictions on the impact effects 
of the shocks, we can use consistency between the theoretical predictions for the impact 
effects and the estimated impulse response functions to make the case that our economic 
interpretation of the estimated shock is valid. Having made that case, the historical 
decompositions allow us to do the counterfactual analysis that is inherent in our 
questions: How would output and prices have evolved if there had been no monetary   9 
shocks? What were the relative contributions of money and real shocks to the late 19th 
century deflation? These results are reported in the next Sections. 
IV. Results – Full Sample 
Prior to estimation we analyzed the time series properties of the data and 
concluded that all the series were I(1) and we therefore estimated the model in first 
differences. That is, we estimated (7). Information criteria tests suggested that a model 
with two lags fit the data well (that is p=2), and we included a trend break in all series in 
1896. Given that the series are all non-stationary and that we estimated (7), the break in 
trend is handled by putting a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 before 1897 and 
takes the value of 1 from 1897 until 1913.  Clearly using two lags in (7) would have 
severely affected the degrees of freedom of the estimator for the individual estimation. 
Table 1 reports tests of slope parameter equality across the countries in the sample. That 
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This test was performed using data from the whole sample (1880-1913) and using 
data for the deflationary sample (1880-1896). In both cases the null hypothesis could not 
be rejected so that our assumption of similar short-run dynamics across the countries in 
our panel is not rejected by the data. Given that there appears to be a trend break in 1896 
a test was performed to see if there was also a structural break in the short-run dynamics 
of the VAR. That is, we tested to see if the estimates of Bij were significantly different for 
the two different periods. Results from these tests are reported in Table 2. For each 
country individually and for the panel estimate there is no evidence of a structural break 
in the short-run dynamics of the system. Therefore, we account for the break in trend 
with intercept adjustments only. 
Structural impulse response functions were estimated using identifications (4) and 
(5). The over-identifying restrictions in (5) were tested and these results can be found in   10 
Table 3. Estimating (1) using data from each country individually we see that the over-
identifying restrictions are rejected for each country. When we estimate (7) using the 
panel estimator we see that neutrality is rejected for the US and the UK but not for 
Germany. Therefore we do not impose neutrality and so use identification (4) to compute 
the structural impulse response functions.  
Structural impulse response functions showing the impact of a 1% shock are 
reported in Figures 3 through 5. Standard error bands show 90% approximate asymptotic 
confidence intervals calculated using the method described in Amisano and Giannini 
(1997).
7 We observe for all countries that the money supply shock has a large positive 
impact on output in the short run, and a much smaller (zero for Germany) long run 
positive impact. In the US, prices and the money stock rise proportionately in response to 
the money shock, though in the other countries the price effect is larger. In each case the 
supply shock is observed to cause a significant temporary decline in prices (recall that the 
long run impact is imposed to be zero). In the US, the long run income elasticity of 
money is roughly unitary (that is, the money stock increases proportionately with 
increases in income) while in Germany and the UK it is somewhat less that unitary. 
Consistently with the interpretation as a demand shock, the direction of the impact of the 
third shock is the same for prices and output. In each case the shock has a negative short 
run impact on prices and output, and a positive impact on money stocks, which is 
consistent with an interpretation that velocity shocks dominated the demand influences.  
Historical decompositions for each shock are reported in Figures 6 through 8.  
The three panels each contain plots of three series: the actual path of the variable, a 
baseline – which incorporates trends and shocks before the estimated period but none of 
the shocks during the estimated period; and a line showing the baseline plus the effect of 
one of the structural shocks. If the third line lies essentially on top of the baseline, then 
the isolated shock had no effect on the variable, while if the third line lies on top of the 
actual line, it shows that the isolated shock accounts for the behaviour of the variable.  
                                                 
7 In fact probably less than 90% given our small sample size.   11 
In all three countries the behaviour of the price level is driven by the money 
shock. That is, while the impulse response functions show that supply shocks have short 
run price effects, the quantitative impact of those effects is negligible. More germane to 
our interests is the behaviour of output. In the UK and Germany supply shocks explain 
virtually all output fluctuations. In the United States, supply shocks are the dominant 
driving force, however, in a number of years money supply shocks have a noticeable 
impact. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that US monetary institutions 
exacerbated output volatility in these periods. In all countries the impact of the demand 
shocks was small.  
The estimated structural shocks are shown in Figure 9. Consistently with our 
interpretation of the history of the period, the money supply shocks are correlated across 
the three countries, as are the supply shocks. The demand shocks are uncorrelated, 
suggesting that there was a significant idiosyncratic component to the temporary shocks. 
Two sensitivity analyses were carried out to check the robustness of our results. 
First we replaced M2 with M0, the monetary base, as our measure of money stock. 
Second we included dummy variables for 1907 and 1908, a period of financial crisis for 
the countries in our sample, in the VAR. In both cases, while the magnitudes of the 
impulse response functions were slightly different, the qualitative results described above 
remain. This was the case for the benchmark VAR for the entire period and the 
subsequent VAR where we add in the world gold stock as an exogenous variable. 
V. Deflationary Period Results 
Using the panel consisting of the three core countries, a PVAR is estimated using 
data from the period 1880-1896. This period saw a substantial price deflation as seen in 
Figure 1. Taking into account the first three periods that are lost due to first differencing 
the data and the two lags used in the PVAR, there are 14 observations for each country. 
Clearly, this would not be enough data to estimate the VAR for each individual country 
in the sample. However, in the PVAR data are pooled from the three countries in the 
panel so that we have a total of 42 observations at our disposal. The test statistic of the   12 
test of slope coefficient equality across countries is 35.75 with a p-value of 0.481 (see 
Table 1). This means that there is no statistical evidence to suggest that we cannot pool 
the data for the deflationary period.  
We began by testing for the over-identifying restrictions in (5), and the results are 
reported in Table 3. Similar to the full sample case we see that the test is rejected for the 
US and is not rejected for Germany. However, for the UK the p-value is now 0.08. Using 
the full sample in the PVAR the p-value for the UK was smaller than 0.001. Given that 
the point estimate of the long run impact of money on output is similar, at about 0.5%, 
the change in the p-value is most likely due to the smaller sample size, and hence larger 
standard errors, rather than there being anything different for the UK in the deflationary 
period. We therefore proceeded by estimating the model without monetary neutrality 
(that is, the model of equation (4)). Figures 10-12 report the structural impulse response 
functions for each country.  
Overall, the impulse response functions for the deflationary period have the same 
qualitative appearance as in the full sample. In particular, for the US and UK the impulse 
responses show that a money supply shock which has a given effect on the long run 
money stock has the same estimated impact on output in both the full sample and the 
deflationary sample. This is an implicit test of the symmetry of the responses in the 
deflationary period and inflationary period, and suggests that, for the late nineteenth/early 
twentieth period that we are examining, responses were symmetric in the two eras. 
Finally the results of the historical decompositions of output are shown in Figures 
13-15. While the sample sizes for the individual countries are small, it is clear for each 
country that the behaviour of prices was driven by the money shock. That is, the deflation 
of the late nineteenth century was generated by negative monetary shocks. The behaviour 
of output is again largely driven by supply shocks, although in the mid-1880s US output 
reflected the impact of all three types of shocks.   13 
VI. Results for the full period with exogenous gold shocks 
Our preferred identification, (5), is driven by the fact that during the period of our 
sample, the countries in our panel were all on the gold standard. We are therefore 
interested in knowing what role, if any, gold shocks played during this period. The model 
that is estimated is 
(9)   ∑∑
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where Goldt is the total world gold stock.
8 In this specification gold is completely 
exogenous to the system. As noted in Section 3, at very long horizons the world gold 
stock may be endogenous, but given the time span of our data exogeneity is a reasonable 
assumption. Table 4 shows the results of a Hausman type test for exogeneity. For all 
countries and all variables we cannot reject the hypothesis that gold is exogenous to our 
variables.
9 A panel VAR is estimated using (9) with slope coefficients, Bj, and the impact 
coefficients of gold, γ j constrained to be equal across countries. Table 1 contains the 
results of the Wald test that tests whether the coefficients on gold in (9) are common 
across the countries in the panel. The reported p-value for this test is 0.63 so the 
hypothesis that the gold coefficients are common across countries cannot be rejected. 
Figures 16 to 18 depict the structural impulse response functions calculated using 
the estimates of (9). These figures are qualitatively similar to the previous impulse 
response functions when gold was not included into the VAR.
10 Figures 20 to 22 depict 
the historical decompositions. Again we see that money contributes most to prices and 
the supply shock explains most of the observed variation in output. It is interesting to 
note that gold does not play an important role in the observed variation of prices and 
output.  
                                                 
8 Gold data are from the US Gold Commission (1982), Vol. I Table SC-6. 
9 Note that the Hausman test is really a test of whether ordinary least squares provide consistent estimates 
of (12). To conduct the Hausman test we use  2 − ∆ t gold  as the instrument for t gold ∆ . 
10 The only qualitative difference is that the monetary shock has a small long run negative impact on 
German output (when we estimate over only the deflationary sample this result is overturned – see below).   14 
We have also re-estimated the model for the deflation sample alone (1880-1896), 
but for space reasons do not include the figures here.
11 The historical decompositions for 
prices show that, as in the case without gold, supply shocks and the non-monetary 
demand shock contribute little to the behaviour of prices. But now the price level is 
explained in part by gold shocks and in part by domestic money shocks. Gold shocks 
however explain little of the output fluctuations.  
Figure 19 shows the impact of a 1% increase in gold supply on prices, output and 
money supply. We see that the long run impact of this gold shock is what we would 
expect under the gold standard. That is, the long-run impact of a 1% increase in gold 
supply is a 1% increase in prices, a 1% increase in money supply and no increase in 
output. This result suggests that our assumptions based on the gold standard are not 
unrealistic.  
However, there is a puzzling result in that the initial impact of the gold shock on 
prices is negative. One reason for this may be that the gold shocks that we are observing 
could be price led rather than being exogenous to the system. That is, lower prices lead to 
gold flows that appear in the data as positive gold supply shocks. This last observation 
would suggest that gold is not entirely exogenous and the possible endogeneity between 
price and gold should be modeled explicitly. How best to model this endogeneity is a 
difficult question as gold supply most probably has an endogenous component and an 
exogenous component. This problem is left for future research. 
VII Conclusions  
Inflation rates around the globe have fallen from historically high levels in the 
1970s and 1980s to numbers close to zero as the 20
th century ended. Indeed some 
countries have experienced actual deflation. Yet output growth rates remain positive. Not 
since the turn of the 19
th century, have economies experienced such low inflation 
associated with non-negative growth, and it seems natural to turn to that period to learn 
about macro behaviour in low inflation or possibly deflationary environments.  
                                                 
11 Figures are available from the authors.   15 
Deflation can reflect the impact of positive aggregate supply shocks (in the 
absence of offsetting positive demand shocks) or negative demand shocks. In the latter 
case, if the aggregate supply curve is non-vertical, the deflation will be ‘bad’ in that it 
will be accompanied by negative output effects.  
Our results show that the deflation in the late nineteenth century gold standard era 
in three key countries reflected both positive aggregate supply and negative money 
supply shocks. Yet  the negative money shock had only a minor effect on output. This we 
posit is because the aggregate supply curve was very steep in the short run. Thus our 
empirical evidence suggests that deflation in the late nineteenth century was primarily 
good. 
Important issues for today’s environment arise from our findings. We need to be 
clear about what was different between the late nineteenth century environment and that 
of the twentieth and twenty first centuries. First, the historical era we analyze was the 
classical gold standard regime under which all three countries were linked together via 
common adherence to the gold standard convertibility rule and all faced a common 
money shock – the vagaries of the gold standard.  
Second, aggregate supply seems to have been an important source of the shocks 
that we identify. This is likely in contrast to the other major deflationary episodes of the 
the twentieth century including: 1920-21, 1929-33, and Japan in the 1990s, which many 
observers posit reflected the consequences of severe monetary contraction.
12 Today’s 
environment in the US, Canada and the EU may indeed be closer to the pre-1914 era than 
the earlier twentieth century episodes.  
Third the short run aggregate supply seems to have been very steep pre-1913. 
This meant that negative demand shocks did not have much of a contractionary bite. This 
result is in sharp contrast to the experience of 1929-33. Many attribute the catastrophic 
                                                 
12 For a contrary view see Kehoe and  Prescott (2002).   16 
declines of output in the face of monetary contraction then to the presence of nominal 
rigidities, in particular sticky wages (Bordo, Erceg and Evans, 2000). 
Our analysis does not deal with many important issues that resonate in today’s 
policy debate over what to do about the spectre of deflation. These include the zero 
nominal bound problem -- that very low inflation by reducing nominal interest rates 
makes it difficult to conduct monetary policy by conventional means (Orphanides, 2001). 
In contrast to today, in the pre-1914 era, little emphasis was placed by the policy makers 
in countries, like the UK and Germany, which had central banks, in using monetary 
policy to stimulate the real economy. Hence the zero nominal bound was not viewed as a 
problem.  
We also do not explicitly distinguish between the effects of actual versus expected 
price level changes. It is unexpected deflation that produces negative consequences. 
However the steep slope of the aggregate supply curve revealed in our work suggests that 
price level changes were large anticipated. We also do not consider the efficiency aspects 
of deflation. According to Friedman (1969), the optimum holding of money would occur 
at a rate of deflation equal to the long run growth rate of real output.  
Finally, although we find that pre-1914 deflation was primarily of the good 
variety, it doesn’t mean that people felt good about it. The common perception of the 
1880s and 1890s in all three countries was that deflation was depressing. This in turn may 
reflect the fact that deflation was largely unanticipated. It may also have reflected money 
illusion.
13 This was reflected in labor strife and political turbulence. This perception can 
be seen in the views of US farmers who believed that the terms of trade had turned 
against them and workers in all three countries who did not view falling money wages as 
being compensated by even more rapidly falling commodity prices. It is doubtful if a true 
deflation today would be any less unpopular.  
                                                 
13 Friedman and Schwartz ( 1963;  41-2) compare the U.S. experience of the 1870s when money growth 
exceeded the growth of the labor force but not the growth of real output so that nominal wages were rising, 
with the 1880s when money growth was less than the growth of the labor force and of real growth and 
money wages declined. They then relate these facts to the increase in labor unrest and agitation over the 
monetary standard.   17 
Table 1: Test of Parameter Equality across Countries 
 
 Statistic  p-value 
Full Sample (1880-1913)  39.27  0.33 
Deflationary Sample (1880-1896)  35.75 0.48 
Gold Coefficients (Gold)   9.83  0.63 
  
 
Table 2: Chow Test of Slope Parameter Stability between 1880-1896 and 1897-1913 
  
 Statistic  p-value 
United States  21.18  0.270 
United Kingdom  19.92  0.337 
Germany 23.16  0.185 




Table 3: Test of Over-identifying Restrictions 
 
  United States  United Kingdom  Germany 
   Statistic  p-value   Statistic  p-value   Statistic  p-value 
Single  Equation  9.19 0.003 3.53 0.061 5.18 0.025 
Panel  (Full  Sample)  33.66 0.000 14.07 0.000 0.192 0.661 
Panel (Deflation Sample)  26.28  0.000 2.97 0.085  0.057  0.811 
 
 
Table 4: Tests of Exogeneity of Gold 
 
  United States  United Kingdom  Germany 
Dependent variable   Statistic  p-value   Statistic  p-value   Statistic  p-value 
Price  0.105 0.75 0.301 0.58 0.706 0.40 
Output  0.108 0.74 0.018 0.89 0.483 0.49 
Money  0.002 0.97 0.001 0.99 0.003 0.95   18 
Figure 1: Data for Core Countries 
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Figure 2: Gold Production: 1873-1913 
 













































































































                                                 
14 The y-axis for all impulse response functions are measured in percentage points.   21 
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Figure 6a: Historical Decomposition of Prices: US (Full Sample)  
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Figure 6b: Historical Decomposition of Output: US (Full Sample)  
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Figure 7a: Historical Decomposition of Prices: UK (Full Sample)  
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Figure 7b: Historical Decomposition of Output: UK (Full Sample)  
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Figure 8a: Historical Decomposition of Prices: Germany (Full Sample)  
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Figure 8b: Historical Decomposition of Output: Germany (Full Sample)  
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Figure 9: Estimated Structural Shocks from the Panel (Full Sample) 
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Figure 13a:Historical Decomposition of Prices: US (Deflationary Sample) 
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Figure 13b: Historical Decomposition of Output: US (Deflationary Sample) 
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Figure 14a: Historical Decomposition of Prices: UK (Deflationary Sample) 
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Figure 14b: Historical Decomposition of Output: UK (Deflationary sample) 
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Figure 15a: Historical Decomposition of Prices: GERMANY (Deflationary Sample) 
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Figure 15b: Historical Decomposition of Output: Germany (Deflationary Sample) 
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Figure 19: Impulse Response to a 1% Increase in Gold 
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Figure 20a: Historical Decomposition of Price: US (Full Sample with Gold) 
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Figure 20b: Historical Decomposition of Output: US (Full Sample with Gold) 
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Figure 21a: Historical Decomposition of Price: UK (Full Sample with Gold) 
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Figure 21b: Historical Decomposition of Output: UK (Full Sample with Gold) 
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Figure 22a: Historical Decomposition of Price: Germany (Full Sample with Gold) 
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Figure 22b: Historical Decomposition of Output: Germany (Full Sample with Gold) 
 






















Baseline + Gold Shock




Amisano, G. and C. Giannini, (1997) Topics in Structural VAR Econometrics, Springer-
Verlag, Berlin. 
 
Balke, N. and R. Gordon (1986) “Historical Data” in Robert J. Gordon, ed., The 
American Business Cycle, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Barro, R. (1979) “Money and the Price Level under the Gold Standard” Economic 
Journal, March (89): 13-33. 
 
Bergman, U., M. Bordo, and L. Jonung (1998), “Historical Evidence on Business Cycles: 
The International Experience” in J. Fuhrer and S. Schuh eds., Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston Conference Series, Beyond Shocks: What causes Business Cycles? (42), 65-113. 
 
Bernanke, B. (1983), “Nonmonetary effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the 
Great Depression,” American Economic Review, 73(3): 257-76. 
 
Blanchard, O.J. and Quah, D. (1989), “The Dynamic Effect of Aggregate Demand and 
Supply Disturbances,” American Economic Review, 79(4), 655-673. 
 
Bordo, M. (1981), “The Classical Gold standard: Some lessons for today,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 63(5): 2-17.  
 
Bordo, M. and R. W. Ellson, (1985) “A Model of the Classical Gold Standard with 
depletion” Journal of Monetary Economics (16): 109-20.  
 
Bordo, M., C. Erceg and C. Evans (2000) “Money, Sticky Wages and the Great 
Depression,” American Economic Review, 90(5), 1447-63. 
 
Bordo, M. and A. Redish (2004) “Is Deflation Depressing?” in Richard Burdekin and 
Pierre Siklos ( eds)  Deflation: Current and Historical Perspectives.  New York: 
Cambridge University Press. (in press) 
 
Borio and Filardo (2003)" Back to the Future? Assessing the Threat of Deflation" Bank 
for International Settlements. Basle  April. 
 
Canova, F. and M. Ciccarealli, (1999) “Forecasting and Turning Point Predictions in a 
Bayesian Panel VAR Model,” mimeo.  
 
Craig, L. and D. Fisher (2000), The European Macroeconomy: Growth and  integration, 
1500-1913, London: Edward Elgar. 
 
Deutsche Bundesbank (1976) Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen, 1876-1975, 
Frankfurt: Herausgeber Deutsche Bundesbank.     50 
 
Dowd, K. and D. Chappell, (1997) “A Simple Model of the Gold Standard” Journal of 
Money Credit and Banking (29:1): 94-105. 
 
Friedman, M. (1969) “The Optimum Quantity of Money” Milton Friedman, The 
Optimum Quantity of Money and other Essays. Chicago: Aldine Publishers. 
 
Holtz-Eakin, D., W. Newey, and H.S. Rosen, (1988) “Estimating Vector Autoregressions 
with Panel Data,” Econometrica, 56(6), 1371-1395. 
 
IMF (2002) “Chapter 3: Recessions and Recoveries”, World Economic Outlook 
 
Kehoe, T. and E. Prescott, (2002) “Great Depressions of the 20
th century,” Review of 
Economic Dynamics, 5(1): 1-18.  
 
Kumar, Mannohan, S. Taimur Baig, Jorg Decressin, Chris Faulkner-MacDanagh and 
Tarhan Feyziogulu (2003) “Deflation: Determinants, Risks, and Policy Options.” IMF 
Occasional Paper #221. 
 
McCloskey, D. and J. R. Zecher (1976) “How the gold standard worked, 1880-1913” in J. 
A. Frenkel and H.G. Johnson, eds., The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.   
 
Mitchell, B. (1998) International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-1993 4
th edn. New 
York: Stockton Press. 
 
Orphanides, A.  (2001) “Monetary Policy rules, macroeconomic stability and inflation: A 
view from the trenches.” Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Finance and Economics 
Discussion paper 2001-62. 
 
Pesaran, M.H. and R. Smith, (1995) “Estimating Long-Run Relationships from Dynamic 
Heterogeneous Panels,” Journal of Econometrics, 68, 78-113. 
 
Rockoff, H. (1984) “Some Evidence on the Real Price of Gold, Its Costs of Production, 
and Commodity Prices” in M.D. Bordo and A. J. Schwartz, A Retrospective on the 
Classical Gold Standard, 1821-1931 Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Sommariva, A. and G. Tullio, (1987) German macroeconomic history, 1880-1970: A 
study of the effects of economic policy on inflation, currency depreciation and growth, 
New York: St Martin’s Press.  
 
United States Gold Commission (1982) Report to the Congress of the Commision on the 
Role of Gold in the Domestic and International Monetary Systems. Washington DC 
March.  
 